On strategy-proofness and symmetric single-peakedness
From MaRDI portal
Publication:550194
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2010.12.001zbMath1217.91051OpenAlexW2122793068MaRDI QIDQ550194
Inés Moreno de Barreda, Jordi Massó
Publication date: 8 July 2011
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2010.12.001
Related Items (7)
Arrow on domain conditions: a fruitful road to travel ⋮ Stable partitions in many division problems: the proportional and the sequential dictator solutions ⋮ Spatial implementation ⋮ The capacity constrained facility location problem ⋮ Maximal domain for strategy-proof probabilistic rules in economies with one public good ⋮ Upper set rules with binary ranges ⋮ Truthful aggregation of budget proposals
Cites Work
- Unnamed Item
- A characterization of the single-peaked domain
- The structure of strategy-proof social choice. I: General characterization and possibility results on median spaces
- Allocating multiple estates among agents with single-peaked preferences
- Sequential elections with limited information. A formal analysis
- Pareto optimality, anonymity, and strategy-proofness in location problems
- Strategy-proof voting on compact ranges
- A characterization of strategy-proof social choice functions for economies with pure public goods
- Voting under constraints
- Strategy-proofness and ``median voters
- Resource-monotonic allocation when preferences are single-peaked
- Individual versus group strategy-proofness: when do they coincide?
- Maximal domain for strategy-proof rules with one public good
- Efficient and strategy-proof voting rules: A characterization
- Strategy-proof division with single-peaked preferences and individual endowments
- An introduction to strategy-proof social choice functions
- The relation between monotonicity and strategy-proofness
- Voting by committees under constraints
- Voting by Committees
- Straightforward Elections, Unanimity and Phantom Voters
- Impossibility of Strategy-Proof Mechanisms in Economies with Pure Public Goods
This page was built for publication: On strategy-proofness and symmetric single-peakedness
