One-dimensional bargaining

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2010.10.007zbMath1229.91036OpenAlexW2085541328MaRDI QIDQ550197

Arkadi Predtetchinski

Publication date: 8 July 2011

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2010.10.007

zbMATH Keywords

convergencecharacteristic functionbargainingsubgame perfect equilibriaacceptance rulestationary strategies

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Related Items (8)

Spatial bargaining in rectilinear facility location problem ⋮ THE POWER OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE CHAIR ⋮ Uniqueness of stationary equilibrium payoffs in coalitional bargaining ⋮ Voting rules and efficiency in one-dimensional bargaining games with endogenous protocol ⋮ One-dimensional bargaining ⋮ On the asymptotic uniqueness of bargaining equilibria ⋮ Uniqueness of stationary equilibria in bargaining one-dimensional policies under (super) majority rules ⋮ Procedural fairness and redistributive proportional tax

Cites Work

• One-dimensional bargaining
• One-dimensional bargaining with Markov recognition probabilities
• Cooperative bargaining foundations of the Shapley-Shubik index
• Efficient delays in a stochastic model of bargaining
• Uniqueness of stationary equilibria in a one-dimensional model of bargaining.
• The representative Nash solution for two-sided bargaining problems
• Uniqueness of stationary equilibrium payoffs in the Baron-Ferejohn model
• Majority rule in a stochastic model of bargaining
• Non-cooperative support for the asymmetric Nash bargaining solution
• Bargaining one-dimensional social choices
• Von Neumann-Morgenstern stable sets, discounting, and Nash bargaining
• Regularity of pure strategy equilibrium points in a class of bargaining games
• The Coalitional Nash Bargaining Solution
• A Stochastic Model of Sequential Bargaining with Complete Information
• Bargaining and Value

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