Bilateral trading with naive traders

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2010.09.009zbMath1217.91116OpenAlexW2049508463MaRDI QIDQ550198

Rene Saran

Publication date: 8 July 2011

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2010.09.009

zbMATH Keywords

efficiencynaive tradersbilateral tradingex-post individual rationality

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Trade models (91B60) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26)

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Mechanism design with level-k types: theory and an application to bilateral trade ⋮ How naiveté improves efficiency in trading with preplay communication ⋮ Fishing for fools ⋮ Efficient mechanisms for level-\(k\) bilateral trading ⋮ Bilateral trading with contingent contracts

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