Identification in first-price and Dutch auctions when the number of potential bidders is unobservable

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2010.10.011zbMath1217.91080OpenAlexW2156879907MaRDI QIDQ550201

Adam Chi Leung Wong, Artyom A. Shneyerov

Publication date: 8 July 2011

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://commons.ln.edu.hk/sw_master/4492

zbMATH Keywords

auctionsnonparametric identification

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (4)

Identification of first-price auctions with non-equilibrium beliefs: a measurement error approach ⋮ Identification of auction models using order statistics ⋮ Are there common values in first-price auctions? A tail-index nonparametric test ⋮ Identification of mixture models using support variations

Cites Work

• Estimating first-price auctions with an unknown number of bidders: a misclassification approach
• Deriving an estimate of the optimal reserve price: An application to British Columbian timber sales
• What model for entry in first-price auctions? A nonparametric approach
• Entry and Competition Effects in First-Price Auctions: Theory and Evidence from Procurement Auctions
• Empirical Implications of Equilibrium Bidding in First-Price, Symmetric, Common Value Auctions
• Asymmetric Auctions
• Optimal Nonparametric Estimation of First-price Auctions
• Econometrics of First-Price Auctions
• Identification of Standard Auction Models
• Note on Extreme Values, Competing Risks and Semi-Markov Processes
• Comparing competition and collusion: a numerical approach.

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