Incentives in core-selecting auctions with single-minded bidders

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2010.11.003zbMath1217.91078OpenAlexW2017295041MaRDI QIDQ550207

Ryuji Sano

Publication date: 8 July 2011

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2010.11.003

zbMATH Keywords

package auctionascending proxy auctioncore-selecting auctionsingle-minded bidder

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (4)

The impact of core constraints on truthful bidding in combinatorial auctions ⋮ Dynamic communication mechanism design ⋮ An equilibrium analysis of a core-selecting package auction with reserve prices ⋮ Core deviation minimizing auctions

Cites Work

• Ascending price Vickrey auctions for general valuations
• The package assignment model.
• Core-selecting package auctions
• Truth revelation in approximately efficient combinatorial auctions

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