Attacker–defender models and road network vulnerability

DOI10.1098/rsta.2008.0019zbMath1153.90002OpenAlexW2050246638WikidataQ51891439 ScholiaQ51891439MaRDI QIDQ5503981

A. Fonzone, Jan-Dirk Schmöcker, U. Kanturska, Michael G. H. Bell

Publication date: 21 January 2009

Published in: Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society A: Mathematical, Physical and Engineering Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1098/rsta.2008.0019

zbMATH Keywords

game theorydefender-attacker-defenderrisk-averse routingnetworks under attacktransport network vulnerability

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Games involving graphs (91A43) Traffic problems in operations research (90B20)

Related Items (6)

Optimal control of networks in the presence of attackers and defenders ⋮ Distributionally risk‐receptive and risk‐averse network interdiction problems with general ambiguity set ⋮ Evolution game model of travel mode choice in metropolitan ⋮ An interdiction game on a queueing network with multiple intruders ⋮ Attacker-defender model against quantal response adversaries for cyber security in logistics management: an introductory study ⋮ Securing infrastructure facilities: when does proactive defense help?

Cites Work

• Solving the Bi-Objective Maximum-Flow Network-Interdiction Problem

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