scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5497275
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Publication:5505127
zbMath1153.91004MaRDI QIDQ5505127
Michel Regenwetter, Ilia Tsetlin, Bernard Grofman, Anthony A. J. Marley
Publication date: 23 January 2009
Title: zbMATH Open Web Interface contents unavailable due to conflicting licenses.
Arrow's Impossibility Theoremdata on real-world electionsdemocratic decision-makinglinks theory and empirical applicationsmathematical tools to estimate majority rule relationship
Voting theory (91B12) Environmental economics (natural resource models, harvesting, pollution, etc.) (91B76) Social choice (91B14) Introductory exposition (textbooks, tutorial papers, etc.) pertaining to game theory, economics, and finance (91-01) Mathematical psychology (91Exx)
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