Limited Rights as Partial Veto and Sen’s Impossibility Theorem

DOI10.1007/978-3-540-79832-3_1zbMath1153.91403OpenAlexW206572675MaRDI QIDQ5506525

Maurice Salles

Publication date: 28 January 2009

Published in: Studies in Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-79832-3_1

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12) Group preferences (91B10) Social choice (91B14)

Related Items

Sen cycles and externalities ⋮ Two impossibility results for social choice under individual indifference intransitivity ⋮ Reconciling marginalism with egalitarianism: consistency, monotonicity, and implementation of egalitarian Shapley values ⋮ Rights Revisited, and Limited

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Semiorders and collective choice
• Interval graphs and interval orders
• Collective rationality and dictatorship: The scope of the Arrow theorem
• Characterization of domains admitting nondictatorial social welfare functions and nonmanipulable voting procedures
• Effectivity functions, game forms, games, and rights
• Invoking a Cartesian product structure on social states. New resolutions of Sen's and Gibbard's impossibility theorems
• Negative externalities and Sen's liberalism theorem
• General Possibility Theorems for Group Decisions