Beyond Normal Form Invariance: First Mover Advantage in Two-Stage Games with or without Predictable Cheap Talk

DOI10.1007/978-3-540-79832-3_12zbMath1153.91342OpenAlexW2151927359MaRDI QIDQ5506538

Peter J. Hammond

Publication date: 28 January 2009

Published in: Studies in Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/269784

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

2-person games (91A05) Multistage and repeated games (91A20) Decision theory for games (91A35)

Related Items (1)

Ideal reactive equilibrium

Cites Work

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• An Approach to Communication Equilibria
• Correlated Equilibrium as an Expression of Bayesian Rationality
• Sequential Equilibria
• Extensive Form Reasoning in Normal Form Games
• Long Cheap Talk
• Refinements of the Nash equilibrium concept

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