The independence of game theory of utility theory

DOI10.1090/S0002-9904-1966-11615-4zbMath0149.17004OpenAlexW2001470136MaRDI QIDQ5528373

Bezalel Peleg

Publication date: 1966

Published in: Bulletin of the American Mathematical Society (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1090/s0002-9904-1966-11615-4

zbMATH Keywords

operations research

Related Items (4)

Representation of characteristic function games by social choice functions ⋮ Games with ordered outcomes ⋮ A differential game without a qualitative saddle point ⋮ A Nash type equilibrium in games without transitive preferences

Cites Work

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• Non-cooperative games
• Von Neumann-Morgenstern solutions to cooperative games without side payments
• Markets with a Continuum of Traders
• Equilibrium Points for Open Acyclic Relations
• Quasi-Cores in a Monetary Economy with Nonconvex Preferences
• Utility Theory without the Completeness Axiom
• A Limit Theorem on the Core of an Economy

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