A price leadership method for solving the inspector's non‐constant‐sum game
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Publication:5534718
DOI10.1002/nav.3800130103zbMath0154.20304OpenAlexW2164504122MaRDI QIDQ5534718
Publication date: 1966
Published in: Naval Research Logistics Quarterly (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1002/nav.3800130103
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