Implications of Pareto efficiency for two-agent (household) choice
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Publication:553519
DOI10.1016/j.jmateco.2011.01.001zbMath1233.91079OpenAlexW2063719205MaRDI QIDQ553519
Lozan Ivanov, Federico Echenique
Publication date: 27 July 2011
Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://authors.library.caltech.edu/20353/
Related Items (8)
A characterization of the \(n\)-agent Pareto dominance relation ⋮ A conjecture on the construction of orderings by Borda's rule ⋮ Pareto rationalizability by two single-peaked preferences ⋮ Backwards-induction rationalizability of choice functions over an arbitrary set ⋮ The testable implications of zero-sum games ⋮ The computational complexity of rationalizing Pareto optimal choice behavior ⋮ Paretian partial orders: the two-agent case ⋮ Revealed preference theory for finite choice sets
Cites Work
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