Efficiency under a combination of ordinal and cardinal information on preferences
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Publication:553528
DOI10.1016/j.jmateco.2011.02.001zbMath1217.90130OpenAlexW2094705055MaRDI QIDQ553528
Publication date: 27 July 2011
Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/101288/files/NDL2011-011r.pdf
Special problems of linear programming (transportation, multi-index, data envelopment analysis, etc.) (90C08) Discrete location and assignment (90B80)
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Cites Work
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- An efficiency theorem for incompletely known preferences
- Ordinal efficiency and the polyhedral separating hyperplane theorem
- Why do popular mechanisms lack efficiency in random environments?
- A solution to the random assignment problem on the full preference domain
- A constructive proof of the ordinal efficiency welfare theorem
- Ordinal efficiency and dominated sets of assignments.
- Random serial dictatorship and ordinally efficient contracts
- Asymptotic Equivalence of Probabilistic Serial and Random Priority Mechanisms
- A new solution to the random assignment problem.
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