A model of partnership formation

DOI10.1016/j.jmateco.2011.02.003zbMath1217.91127OpenAlexW3121899422MaRDI QIDQ553531

Zaifu Yang, Adolphus J. J. Talman

Publication date: 27 July 2011

Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://pure.uvt.nl/portal/en/publications/a-model-of-partnership-formation(69e159c9-1700-49f0-ad7f-f863a9d12590).html

zbMATH Keywords

equilibriumindivisibilitypartnership formationassignment market

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Discrete location and assignment (90B80) Matching models (91B68)

Related Items

An exploration in school formation: income vs. ability ⋮ Investments and the holdup problem in a matching market ⋮ Constrained-optimal tradewise-stable outcomes in the one-sided assignment game: a solution concept weaker than the core ⋮ When partner knows best: asymmetric expertise in partnerships ⋮ Gross substitutes and complements: a simple generalization ⋮ Strong coalitional equilibrium in a transportation game ⋮ A competitive partnership formation process ⋮ Strong Coalitional Structure in an Open Vehicle Routing Game ⋮ A method for finding the maximal set in excess demand

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Core and competitive equilibria with indivisibilities
• The existence and computation of competitive equilibria in markets with an indivisible commodity
• Cores of partitioning games
• Necessary and sufficient conditions for balancedness in partitioning games
• Walrasian equilibrium with gross substitutes
• Stable outcomes of the roommate game with transferable utility
• The English auction with differentiated commodities
• On the existence of stable roommate matchings
• On cores and indivisibility
• A necessary and sufficient condition for non-emptiness of the core of a non-transferable utility game
• Endogenous formation of cooperation structures
• The assignment game. I: The core
• Endogenous Formation of Coalitions
• Large Indivisibles: An Analysis with Respect to Price Equilibrium and Fairness
• A necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of a complete stable matching
• Assignment Problems and the Location of Economic Activities
• Equilibria and Indivisibilities: Gross Substitutes and Complements
• A Double-Track Adjustment Process for Discrete Markets With Substitutes and Complements
• Job Matching, Coalition Formation, and Gross Substitutes