The role of private information in dynamic matching and bargaining: can it be good for efficiency?
From MaRDI portal
Publication:553895
DOI10.1016/j.econlet.2011.03.016zbMath1217.91081OpenAlexW1966169171MaRDI QIDQ553895
Adam Chi Leung Wong, Artyom A. Shneyerov
Publication date: 28 July 2011
Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://commons.ln.edu.hk/sw_master/4491
Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Economics of information (91B44)
Related Items (4)
Asymmetric information in bilateral trade and in markets: an inversion result ⋮ Price discovery in a matching and bargaining market with aggregate uncertainty ⋮ An optimistic search equilibrium ⋮ Entry-deterring agency
Cites Work
- Asymmetric information in bilateral trade and in markets: an inversion result
- Convergence to perfect competition of a dynamic matching and bargaining market with two-sided incomplete information and exogenous exit rate
- The rate of convergence to perfect competition of matching and bargaining mechanisms
- Limit theorems for markets with sequential bargaining
- Bilateral matching and bargaining with private information
- On the Efficiency of Matching and Related Models of Search and Unemployment
- Decentralized Trading, Strategic Behaviour and the Walrasian Outcome
- Dynamic Matching, Two-Sided Incomplete Information, and Participation Costs: Existence and Convergence to Perfect Competition
- Equilibrium in a Market with Sequential Bargaining
- Bargaining and Competition Part I: Characterization
This page was built for publication: The role of private information in dynamic matching and bargaining: can it be good for efficiency?
