A game with no solution
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Publication:5540172
DOI10.1090/S0002-9904-1968-11901-9zbMath0157.51101OpenAlexW2067594649MaRDI QIDQ5540172
Publication date: 1968
Published in: Bulletin of the American Mathematical Society (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1090/s0002-9904-1968-11901-9
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