Information aggregation in multicandidate elections under plurality rule and runoff voting

DOI10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2011.03.003zbMath1229.91111OpenAlexW2064826385MaRDI QIDQ554490

Patrick Hummel

Publication date: 4 August 2011

Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2011.03.003

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12)

Related Items (4)

Inefficient committees: small elections with three alternatives ⋮ Pre-election polling and third party candidates ⋮ Stress-testing the runoff rule in the laboratory ⋮ Unnamed Item

Cites Work

• Convergence results for unanimous voting
• A Bayesian model of voting in juries
• Proving a distribution-free generalization of the Condorcet jury theorem
• Condorcet's jury theorem, dependency among jurors
• Extended Poisson games and the Condorcet jury theorem
• A brief note on a further refinement of the Condorcet jury theorem for heterogeneous groups
• Rational choice and the Condorcet jury theorem
• Jury theorems with multiple alternatives
• When is Condorcet's jury theorem valid?
• Informative voting and condorcet jury theorems with a continuum of types
• A note on the Condorcet jury theorem with supermajority voting rules

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