Equilibrium Points for Games with Infinitely Many Players
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Publication:5548728
DOI10.1112/jlms/s1-44.1.292zbMath0164.20204OpenAlexW2155304018MaRDI QIDQ5548728
Publication date: 1969
Published in: Journal of the London Mathematical Society (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1112/jlms/s1-44.1.292
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Projections and functions of Nash equilibria ⋮ The possibility of impossible stairways: tail events and countable player sets ⋮ Symmetry and approximate equilibria in games with countably many players ⋮ Equilibria Existence in Bayesian Games: Climbing the Countable Borel Equivalence Relation Hierarchy ⋮ Robustness of equilibria in anonymous local games ⋮ A note on discontinuity and approximate equilibria in games with infinitely many players ⋮ Modeling large societies: why countable additivity is necessary ⋮ Approximate equilibria in strongly symmetric games ⋮ The context of the game ⋮ Perfect information games where each player acts only once ⋮ On the existence of Nash equilibria in large games ⋮ More on the `anti-folk theorem' ⋮ On abstract economies with an arbitrary set of players and action sets in locally-convex topological vector spaces
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