Über ein Paradoxon aus der Verkehrsplanung
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Publication:5554806
DOI10.1007/BF01918335zbMath0167.48305MaRDI QIDQ5554806
Publication date: 1968
Published in: Unternehmensforschung Operations Research - Recherche Opérationnelle (Search for Journal in Brave)
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