Toward a study of bidding processes part IV ‐ games with unknown costs

DOI10.1002/nav.3800140402zbMath0227.90072OpenAlexW2110933102MaRDI QIDQ5635296

James H. Griesmer, Martin Shubik, R. Levitan

Publication date: 1967

Published in: Naval Research Logistics Quarterly (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1002/nav.3800140402

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Other game-theoretic models (91A40)

Related Items (30)

On the Complexity of Equilibrium Computation in First-Price Auctions ⋮ Procurement auctions with capacity constrained suppliers ⋮ Optimal bidding in auctions from a game theory perspective ⋮ First-price auctions where one of the bidders' valuations is common knowledge ⋮ Static game theory models and their applications in management science ⋮ Three minimal market institutions with human and algorithmic agents: theory and experimental evidence ⋮ Government procurement and asymmetric rebate auctions ⋮ Adversarial risk analysis for first‐price sealed‐bid auctions ⋮ Adversarial risk analysis for auctions using non-strategic play and level-k thinking: A general case of n bidders with regret ⋮ Asymmetric first-price auctions with uniform distributions: analytic solutions to the general case ⋮ Bilateral \(k+1\)-price auctions with asymmetric shares and values ⋮ Pre-auction offers in asymmetric first-price and second-price auctions ⋮ Necessary and sufficient conditions for peace: implementability versus security ⋮ Characterization and computation of Nash-equilibria for auctions with incomplete information ⋮ The effect of bidders' asymmetries on expected revenue in auctions ⋮ Multidimensional private value auctions ⋮ Auctioning Böhm-Bawerk's horses ⋮ Asymptotic revenue equivalence of asymmetric auctions with interdependent values ⋮ Asymmetric first price auctions ⋮ Competitive bidding in asymmetric multidimensional public procurement ⋮ Pure strategy equilibria of single and double auctions with interdependent values ⋮ First-price auction symmetric equilibria with a general distribution ⋮ Biased procurement auctions ⋮ Existence of an equilibrium in first price auctions ⋮ Comparative statics in first price auctions ⋮ Revenue and efficiency effects of resale in first-price auctions ⋮ \(k\)-price auctions ⋮ Competitive bidding and proprietary information ⋮ Numerical Solution of Asymmetric Auctions ⋮ Adversarial Risk Analysis for Auctions Using Mirror Equilibrium and Bayes Nash Equilibrium

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