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On a Class of Equilibrium Conditions for Majority Rule - MaRDI portal

On a Class of Equilibrium Conditions for Majority Rule

From MaRDI portal
Publication:5678620

DOI10.2307/1913490zbMath0262.90005OpenAlexW2140862263MaRDI QIDQ5678620

Gerald H. Kramer

Publication date: 1973

Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://cowles.yale.edu/sites/default/files/files/pub/d02/d0284.pdf




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