On the Value of Commitment with Asymmetric Information

DOI10.2307/2171836zbMath0868.90025OpenAlexW2016854782MaRDI QIDQ5689666

Patrick Rey, Bernard Salanié

Publication date: 7 January 1997

Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.2307/2171836

zbMATH Keywords

adverse selectionrenegotiationlong-run efficiencyshort-term contractsmultiperiod principal-agent relationship

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Hierarchical systems (93A13) Economic growth models (91B62)

Related Items (9)

Delegated Concept Testing in New Product Development ⋮ Renegotiation-proof contract in repeated agency ⋮ Repeated contracting without commitment ⋮ Optimality and renegotiation in dynamic contracting ⋮ Contracting with imperfect commitment and noisy communication ⋮ Dynamic incentive contracts with termination threats ⋮ Dynamic yardstick mechanisms ⋮ For how long to tie your hands? Stable relationships in an unstable environment ⋮ The dynamics of productive assets, contract duration and holdup

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