Pareto efficiency, simple game stability, and social structure in finitely repeated games

DOI10.1080/0022250X.1995.9990152zbMath0861.90152MaRDI QIDQ5691279

Gregory B. Pollock

Publication date: 27 January 1997

Published in: The Journal of Mathematical Sociology (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

social structurefinitely repeated gamesevolutionary simple game theoryloss of cooperationperennial invasion by mutant-clusters

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Problems related to evolution (92D15) Applications of game theory (91A80) Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Multistage and repeated games (91A20) Mathematical sociology (including anthropology) (91D99)

Cites Work

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• Some Thoughts on the Minimax Principle

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