DEADLINE EFFECTS IN SEQUENTIAL BARGAINING — AN EXPERIMENTAL STUDY
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Publication:5692575
DOI10.1142/S0219198905000442zbMath1117.91322OpenAlexW2017837382MaRDI QIDQ5692575
M. Vittoria Levati, Boris Maciejovsky, Güth, Werner
Publication date: 28 September 2005
Published in: International Game Theory Review (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1142/s0219198905000442
Noncooperative games (91A10) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Experimental studies (91A90)
Cites Work
- Deadline effects and inefficient delay in bargaining with endogenous commitment
- Bargaining under a deadline: Evidence from the reverse ultimatum game.
- A Bargaining Model with Incomplete Information About Time Preferences
- Bargaining and Strikes
- Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model
- Sequential Bargaining with Incomplete Information
- A Generalized Nash Solution for Two-Person Bargaining Games with Incomplete Information
- Two-Person Cooperative Games
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