HELPING AND SABOTAGING IN TOURNAMENTS

DOI10.1142/S0219198905000491zbMath1102.91015OpenAlexW2112958811MaRDI QIDQ5692580

Matthias Kräkel

Publication date: 28 September 2005

Published in: International Game Theory Review (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1142/s0219198905000491

zbMATH Keywords

cost effectlikelihood effect

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

2-person games (91A05) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Related Items (8)

Dynamic Multi‐Activity Contests* ⋮ Equal, proportional, and mixed sharing of cooperative production under the threat of sabotage ⋮ Sabotaging potential rivals ⋮ Additive multi-effort contests ⋮ On sabotage in collective tournaments ⋮ Multi-activity contests ⋮ Collusion in homogeneous and heterogeneous tournaments ⋮ Contest with attack and defense: Does negative campaigning increase or decrease voter turnout?

Cites Work

• Extremal equlibria of oligopolistic supergames
• Optimal cartel equilibria with imperfect monitoring
• A collective tournament
• Noncooperative Collusion under Imperfect Price Information
• Dynamic Duopoly: Prices and Quantities
• A Model of Promotional Competition in Oligopoly
• The Internal Economics of the Firm: Evidence from Personnel Data
• The Wage Policy of a Firm

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