RESTRICTED COALITIONS IN THE MANAGEMENT OF REGIONAL FISHERIES ORGANIZATIONS

DOI10.1111/J.1939-7445.2004.TB00128.XzbMath1138.91569OpenAlexW2093836031MaRDI QIDQ5697253

Marko Lindroos

Publication date: 17 October 2005

Published in: Natural Resource Modeling (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1939-7445.2004.tb00128.x

zbMATH Keywords

Shapley valueCoalitionshigh seas fisheries

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80) Environmental economics (natural resource models, harvesting, pollution, etc.) (91B76)

Related Items (2)

Sustainable coalitions in the commons ⋮ THE SIZE OF FARSIGHTED STABLE COALITIONS IN A GAME OF POLLUTION ABATEMENT

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• The nucleolus and kernel of veto-rich transferable utility games
• Graphs and Cooperation in Games
• SHARING THE BENEFITS OF COOPERATION IN HIGH SEAS FISHERIES: A CHARACTERISTIC FUNCTION GAME APPROACH
• THE CONSERVATION AND MANAGEMENT OF HIGH SEAS FISHERY RESOURCES UNDER THE NEW LAW OF THE SEA
• DYNAMIC COOPERATIVE GAMES
• SHARING THE BENEFITS OF COOPERATION IN THE NORWEGIAN SPRING-SPAWNING HERRING FISHERY

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