Asymmetric First-Price Auctions—A Perturbation Approach

DOI10.1287/moor.28.4.836.20510zbMath1082.91043OpenAlexW2144067068MaRDI QIDQ5704152

Arieh Gavious, Gadi Fibich

Publication date: 11 November 2005

Published in: Mathematics of Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.28.4.836.20510

zbMATH Keywords

perturbation analysisAsymmetric auctions

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (21)

Revenue equivalence in asymmetric auctions ⋮ Auctioning risk: the all-pay auction under mean-variance preferences ⋮ Prebidding first-price auctions with and without head starts ⋮ All-pay auctions with risk-averse players ⋮ Shapley-Folkman-Lyapunov theorem and asymmetric first price auctions ⋮ Numerical simulations of asymmetric first-price auctions ⋮ The optimal sorting of players in contests between groups ⋮ Ranking asymmetric auctions: filling the gap between a distributional shift and stretch ⋮ Ranking asymmetric auctions ⋮ Revenue Equivalence of Large Asymmetric Auctions ⋮ Qualitative analysis of Bayes-Nash equilibrium in weak asymmetric auctions ⋮ Large auctions with risk-averse bidders ⋮ Asymptotic revenue equivalence of asymmetric auctions with interdependent values ⋮ Asymmetric first price auctions ⋮ Asymmetric budget constraints in a first-price auction ⋮ Auctions with almost homogeneous bidders ⋮ Learning in Repeated Auctions ⋮ Revenue Comparison in Asymmetric Auctions with Discrete Valuations ⋮ Large Asymmetric First-Price Auctions---A Boundary-Layer Approach ⋮ Numerical Solution of Asymmetric Auctions ⋮ Adversarial Risk Analysis for Auctions Using Mirror Equilibrium and Bayes Nash Equilibrium

This page was built for publication: Asymmetric First-Price Auctions—A Perturbation Approach