On Houseswapping, the Strict Core, Segmentation, and Linear Programming

DOI10.1287/moor.1040.0106zbMath1082.91021OpenAlexW3123070636MaRDI QIDQ5704202

Thomas Quint, Jun Wako

Publication date: 11 November 2005

Published in: Mathematics of Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://cowles.yale.edu/sites/default/files/files/pub/d14/d1416.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

computational complexitylinear programmingextreme pointpolyhedronstrict coreindivisible goodtop trading cycleShapley-Scarf houseswapping gametop trading segmentation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Polyhedral combinatorics, branch-and-bound, branch-and-cut (90C57) Cooperative games (91A12) Games involving graphs (91A43) Deterministic network models in operations research (90B10) (n)-person games, (n>2) (91A06)

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On the integration of Shapley-Scarf markets ⋮ Preference revelation games and strict cores of multiple‐type housing market problems ⋮ Multi resource allocation with partial preferences ⋮ Housing markets since Shapley and Scarf ⋮ Stability of an allocation of objects ⋮ The difference indifference makes in strategy-proof allocation of objects ⋮ Housing markets through graphs ⋮ On the existence of a strictly strong Nash equilibrium under the student-optimal deferred acceptance algorithm ⋮ Cooperative Games (Von Neumann-Morgenstern Stable Sets) ⋮ On the solution of \(w\)-stable sets ⋮ Exchange of indivisible goods and indifferences: the top trading absorbing sets mechanisms

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