POTENTIAL MAXIMIZATION AND COALITION GOVERNMENT FORMATION

DOI10.1142/S0219198905000612zbMath1116.91031OpenAlexW3121341409MaRDI QIDQ5716141

Rod Garratt, Cheng-Zhong Qin, James E. Parco, Amnon Rapoport

Publication date: 9 January 2006

Published in: International Game Theory Review (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1142/s0219198905000612

zbMATH Keywords

Nash equilibrium refinementsminimal winning

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Experimental studies (91A90)

Related Items (1)

Competitive burnout: theory and experimental evidence

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Coalition formation and potential games
• Potential games
• Endogenous formation of cooperation structures
• Potential maximizers and network formation
• The Effects of Communication and Information Availability in an Experimental Study of a Three-Person Game
• Graphs and Cooperation in Games
• Coalitions and payoffs in three‐person sequential games: Initial tests of two formal models

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