COOPERATION AND COMPETITION: LEARNING OF STRATEGIES AND EVOLUTION OF PREFERENCES IN PRISONERS' DILEMMA AND HAWK-DOVE GAMES

DOI10.1142/S0219198905000636zbMath1116.91023MaRDI QIDQ5716143

Alex Possajennikov

Publication date: 9 January 2006

Published in: International Game Theory Review (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

replicator dynamicbest response learningtwo-speed evolution

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26) Evolutionary games (91A22)

Related Items (1)

Incomplete information, dynamic stability and the evolution of preferences: two examples

Cites Work

• Best response dynamics and socially stable strategies
• Nash equilibrium and the evolution of preferences
• Cooperation, secret handshakes, and imitation in the prisoners' dilemma

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