A Limit Theorem on the Core of an Economy

DOI10.2307/2525306zbMath0122.37702OpenAlexW4235413659WikidataQ56287115 ScholiaQ56287115MaRDI QIDQ5734854

Herbert E. Scarf, Gerard Debreu

Publication date: 1963

Published in: International Economic Review (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.2307/2525306

zbMATH Keywords

operations research

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