Equilibria of Greedy Combinatorial Auctions
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Publication:5737806
DOI10.1137/15M1048720zbMath1414.91153OpenAlexW2598569371MaRDI QIDQ5737806
Publication date: 30 May 2017
Published in: SIAM Journal on Computing (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1137/15m1048720
Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Approximation algorithms (68W25) Software, source code, etc. for problems pertaining to game theory, economics, and finance (91-04)
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