Auctions with Dynamic Costly Information Acquisition

DOI10.1287/OPRE.2016.1558zbMath1414.91150OpenAlexW3122591948MaRDI QIDQ5739116

Negin Golrezaei, Hamid Nazerzadeh

Publication date: 2 June 2017

Published in: Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://semanticscholar.org/paper/2e4d511aa3500817bd7a7cf79e2264a8d75eadcf

zbMATH Keywords

auctionsmechanism designonline advertising

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Marketing, advertising (90B60)

Related Items (1)

Long-Term Partnership for Achieving Efficient Capacity Allocation

This page was built for publication: Auctions with Dynamic Costly Information Acquisition