Fare Evasion in Transit Networks

DOI10.1287/opre.2016.1560zbMath1364.90059arXiv1405.2826OpenAlexW1482846566WikidataQ65553886 ScholiaQ65553886MaRDI QIDQ5739119

José R. Correa, Vincent J. C. Kreuzen, Tobias Harks, Jannik Matuschke

Publication date: 2 June 2017

Published in: Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1405.2826

zbMATH Keywords

bilevel optimizationtransit networks

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Deterministic network models in operations research (90B10) Traffic problems in operations research (90B20)

Related Items (7)

A sequential Stackelberg game for dynamic inspection problems ⋮ Decomposition of probability marginals for security games in abstract networks ⋮ Exact Solution of the Evasive Flow Capturing Problem ⋮ Discussion of Fairness and Implementability in Stackelberg Security Games ⋮ Moving towards a more accurate level of inspection against fare evasion in \textit{proof-of-payment} transit systems ⋮ The Shortest Path Interdiction Problem with Randomized Interdiction Strategies: Complexity and Algorithms ⋮ Computing Constrained Shortest-Paths at Scale

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