Reducing Revenue to Welfare Maximization: Approximation Algorithms and other Generalizations

DOI10.1137/1.9781611973105.42zbMath1426.91109arXiv1305.4000OpenAlexW2950283498MaRDI QIDQ5741750

S. Matthew Weinberg, Yang Cai, Constantinos Daskalakis

Publication date: 15 May 2019

Published in: Proceedings of the Twenty-Fourth Annual ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1305.4000

zbMATH Keywords

approximation algorithmswelfare maximizationmulti-dimensional Bayesian auction

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Approximation algorithms (68W25) Welfare economics (91B15)

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