scientific article; zbMATH DE number 7053334
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Publication:5743456
zbMath1425.91144MaRDI QIDQ5743456
Flavio Chierichetti, Jon M. Kleinberg
Publication date: 10 May 2019
Full work available at URL: https://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=2095198
Title: zbMATH Open Web Interface contents unavailable due to conflicting licenses.
Voting theory (91B12) Combinatorial probability (60C05) Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28)
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