Strict linear prices in non-convex European day-ahead electricity markets

DOI10.1080/10556788.2013.823544zbMath1282.90110arXiv1203.4177OpenAlexW2024629168MaRDI QIDQ5746692

Alexander Martin, Johannes C. Müller, Sebastian Pokutta

Publication date: 7 February 2014

Published in: Optimization Methods and Software (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1203.4177

zbMATH Keywords

discrete optimizationelectricity marketsMPECcombinatorial auctionsstrict linear prices

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Mixed integer programming (90C11) Complementarity and equilibrium problems and variational inequalities (finite dimensions) (aspects of mathematical programming) (90C33) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Combinatorial games (91A46) Welfare economics (91B15)

Related Items (9)

Computationally efficient MIP formulation and algorithms for European day-ahead electricity market auctions ⋮ On the determination of European day ahead electricity prices: the Turkish case ⋮ Pricing combinatorial auctions by a set of linear price vectors ⋮ A pricing scheme for combinatorial auctions based on bundle sizes ⋮ Revisiting minimum profit conditions in uniform price day-ahead electricity auctions ⋮ Pricing and clearing combinatorial markets with singleton and swap orders. Efficient algorithms for the futures opening auction problem ⋮ Unified value-based feedback, optimization and risk management in complex electric energy systems ⋮ Extensions for Benders cuts and new valid inequalities for solving the European day-ahead electricity market clearing problem efficiently ⋮ Core Pricing in Combinatorial Exchanges with Financially Constrained Buyers: Computational Hardness and Algorithmic Solutions

Uses Software

• BARON
• SCIP
• CPLEX
• Couenne
• Bonmin
• EMCC Optimizer

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Efficient market-clearing prices in markets with nonconvexities
• Equality relating Euclidean distance cone to positive semidefinite cone
• Block order restrictions in combinatorial electric energy auctions
• Generalized Benders decomposition

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