The job search problem as an employer–candidate game

DOI10.2307/3214825zbMath0719.60046OpenAlexW2095535341MaRDI QIDQ5751679

E. J. Collins, John M. McNamara

Publication date: 1990

Published in: Journal of Applied Probability (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.2307/3214825

zbMATH Keywords

Nash equilibriumjob search problemSecretary Problempolicy for accepting offerspolicy for making offers

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Stopping times; optimal stopping problems; gambling theory (60G40)

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Optimal Strategies in Best-Choice Game with Incomplete Information — The Voice Show ⋮ Managing parallel inquiries in agents' two-sided search ⋮ Evolution of decisions in population games with sequentially searching individuals ⋮ Separation cycles ⋮ Price competition between random and assortive matchmakers ⋮ Mate choice when males are in patches: optimal strategies and good rules of thumb ⋮ Stable marriages and search frictions ⋮ A model of best choice under incomplete information ⋮ A finite decentralized marriage market with bilateral search ⋮ Strategic mating with common preferences ⋮ A Model of Partnership Formation with Friction and Multiple Criteria ⋮ Partnership formation based on multiple traits ⋮ A search model of two-sided matching under nontransferable utility. ⋮ A Large Population Partnership Formation Game with Associative Preferences and Continuous Time ⋮ Lagrangean Methods and Optimal Stopping ⋮ A large population job search game with discrete time ⋮ Exploration costs as a means for improving performance in multiagent systems ⋮ Two-sided search and perfect segregation with fixed search costs ⋮ Matching with noise and the acceptance curse ⋮ An amalgation of games ⋮ Equilibria of two-sided matching games with common preferences ⋮ A partnership formation game with common preferences and scramble competition

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