Impossibility of Strategy-Proof Mechanisms in Economies with Pure Public Goods
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Publication:5752263
DOI10.2307/2298048zbMath0719.90004OpenAlexW1972516783MaRDI QIDQ5752263
Publication date: 1991
Published in: The Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.2307/2298048
strategy-proof mechanismGibbard-Satterthwaite impossibility theoremdictatorial mechanismpivotal-voter techniquerestricted domain of admissible preferences
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