Optimal Information Disclosure in Auctions and the Handicap Auction
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Publication:5755042
DOI10.1111/j.1467-937X.2007.00442.xzbMath1171.91012OpenAlexW2160062365MaRDI QIDQ5755042
Publication date: 20 August 2007
Published in: Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-937x.2007.00442.x
Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28)
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