Relational Incentives and Moral Hazard in Teams
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Publication:5755050
DOI10.1111/j.1467-937X.2007.00443.xzbMath1171.91016OpenAlexW2093485808MaRDI QIDQ5755050
Publication date: 20 August 2007
Published in: The Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-937x.2007.00443.x
Related Items (13)
Discounted stochastic games with voluntary transfers ⋮ Optimal sharing rules in repeated partnerships ⋮ Delegation, monitoring, and relational contracts ⋮ Infinitely repeated games with public monitoring and monetary transfers ⋮ Moral hazard and subjective evaluation ⋮ Profit-sharing and efficient time allocation ⋮ Renegotiation-proof relational contracts ⋮ The interaction between explicit and relational incentives: an experiment ⋮ Self-regulation through Goal Setting* ⋮ Dynamic relational contracts under complete information ⋮ Team incentives with imperfect mutual inference ⋮ GROWTH, STAGNATION AND STATUS PREFERENCE ⋮ ENVY, INSTITUTIONS AND GROWTH
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