Systems of Logic Based on Ordinals†
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Publication:5773619
DOI10.1112/plms/s2-45.1.161zbMath0021.09704OpenAlexW4291166496WikidataQ7663875 ScholiaQ7663875MaRDI QIDQ5773619
Publication date: 1939
Published in: Proceedings of the London Mathematical Society (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/21.11116/0000-0001-91CE-3
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