Viable allocations of information in financial markets

DOI10.1016/0022-0531(87)90116-5zbMath0624.90007OpenAlexW1968791788MaRDI QIDQ579102

Paul Pfleiderer, Anat R. Admati

Publication date: 1987

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(87)90116-5

zbMATH Keywords

signalsfinancial marketendogenous information acquisition

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets) (91B24)

Related Items

A monopolistic market for information, Market equilibria with endogenous, hierarchical information, The value of recommendations, Overconfidence and market efficiency with heterogeneous agents, A labor-market approach to understanding information sharing among banks: discussions on: ``A tale of two markets: labor market mobility and bank information sharing, Informational asymmetries and a multiplier effect on price correlation and trading, Diversification in parametric rational expectations economies

Cites Work

• The law of large numbers with a continuum of i.i.d. random variables
• A monopolistic market for information
• On the aggregation of information in competitive markets
• The value of information in a sealed-bid auction
• Further results on the informational efficiency of competitive stock markets
• A Noisy Rational Expectations Equilibrium for Multi-Asset Securities Markets
• Informed Speculation with Imperfect Competition
• Information Acquisition in a Noisy Rational Expectations Economy
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