Decomposition of games with non-empty core into veto-controlled simple games

DOI10.1007/BF01732642zbMath0625.90099WikidataQ59868890 ScholiaQ59868890MaRDI QIDQ580201

Jean J. M. Derks

Publication date: 1987

Published in: OR Spektrum (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

polyhedral conenon-empty corenon-negative gamesveto-controlled simple games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Polytopes and polyhedra (52Bxx)

Related Items

Cores and related solution concepts for multi-choice games, Core stability of the Shapley value for cooperative games, Population monotonic allocation schemes for cooperative games with transferable utility

Cites Work

• On the uniqueness of the Shapley value
• Totally Balanced Games and Games of Flow