A Set of Independent Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for Simple Majority Decision
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Publication:5813597
DOI10.2307/1907651zbMath0047.38402OpenAlexW2327081444MaRDI QIDQ5813597
Publication date: 1952
Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://semanticscholar.org/paper/e86208a7ff1e6abaa427dca3618f6d9b5607e954
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