Efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading
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Publication:585101
DOI10.1016/0022-0531(83)90048-0zbMath0523.90099OpenAlexW2087530244WikidataQ55966564 ScholiaQ55966564MaRDI QIDQ585101
Roger B. Myerson, Mark Allen Satterthwaite
Publication date: 1983
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://www.kellogg.northwestern.edu/research/math/papers/469.pdf
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