Long‐Term Contracting With Time‐Inconsistent Agents

DOI10.3982/ECTA17126zbMath1475.91151OpenAlexW3137028617MaRDI QIDQ5860028

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Publication date: 18 November 2021

Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.3982/ecta17126

zbMATH Keywords

regulationdynamic inconsistencypresent biasbehavioral industrial organization

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Contract theory (moral hazard, adverse selection) (91B41)

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Present bias in the labor market -- when it pays to be naive ⋮ Renegotiation and dynamic inconsistency: contracting with non-exponential discounting

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