Optimal Auction Design With Common Values: An Informationally Robust Approach

DOI10.3982/ECTA16297zbMath1475.91109OpenAlexW3158791481MaRDI QIDQ5860141

Songzi Du, Benjamin Brooks

Publication date: 18 November 2021

Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.3982/ecta16297

zbMATH Keywords

direct mechanismmechanism designprofit maximizationmaxmincommon valueinformation structureoptimal auctionsinformation designBayes correlated equilibrium

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Mechanism design theory (91B03)

Related Items (6)

Correlation-robust auction design ⋮ Robust contracting in general contract spaces ⋮ Mechanism design with model specification ⋮ Information design in optimal auctions ⋮ Distributionally robust pricing in independent private value auctions ⋮ Robust incentives for risk

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