scientific article; zbMATH DE number 7431114
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Publication:5860587
zbMath1478.91078MaRDI QIDQ5860587
Publication date: 19 November 2021
Full work available at URL: http://archives-web.univ-paris1.fr/rev-inv-ope/fileadmin/rev-inv-ope/files/40419/40419-08.pdf
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