Cryptographically Sound Security Proofs for Basic and Public-Key Kerberos

DOI10.1007/11863908_23zbMath1487.94149OpenAlexW81189796MaRDI QIDQ5862527

Iliano Cervesato, Joe-Kai Tsay, Michael Backes, Aaron D. Jaggard, Andrej Scedrov

Publication date: 9 March 2022

Published in: Computer Security – ESORICS 2006 (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/summary?doi=10.1.1.62.311

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cryptography (94A60) Authentication, digital signatures and secret sharing (94A62)

Related Items (3)

The reactive simulatability (RSIM) framework for asynchronous systems ⋮ Breaking and fixing public-key Kerberos ⋮ On Simulatability Soundness and Mapping Soundness of Symbolic Cryptography

Uses Software

• AVISPA

Cites Work

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• FST TCS 2003: Foundations of Software Technology and Theoretical Computer Science
• Programming Languages and Systems
• Advances in Cryptology - CRYPTO 2003
• Computer Aided Verification
• Automata, Languages and Programming
• A Cryptographically Sound Dolev-Yao Style Security Proof of the Otway-Rees Protocol
• Theory of Cryptography
• Theory of Cryptography

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